Earl Peeples v. James Citta by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-15-2012 
Earl Peeples v. James Citta 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Earl Peeples v. James Citta" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 283. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/283 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
ALD-003
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2389 
___________ 
 
EARL PEEPLES, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
HONORABLE JAMES N. CITTA, Justice of the  
Superior Court of New Jersey; THE COUNTY OF OCEAN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:11-cv-06238 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 4, 2012 
Before:  SLOVITER, VANASKIE and WEIS, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: October 15, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Earl Peeples, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from an 
order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing with 
prejudice his civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Because this 
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appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order.  See
 Because we primarily write for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In submissions to the District Court, Peeples asserts that Judge Citta, 
the Superior Court of New Jersey judge who presided over Peeples’ criminal trial, 
violated various ethical canons by accepting a statement made by his victim’s mother into 
evidence at sentencing and by commenting that Peeples’ picture should be used to 
illustrate the topic of domestic violence and that there were similarities between his trial 
and the trial of O.J. Simpson.  Peeples also alleges that Judge Citta is not entitled to 
absolute immunity because he acted with a “malicious intention” to deprive Peeples of 
his First Amendment right to free speech by imposing a retaliatory sentence. 
 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In October 2011, Peeples filed this civil rights action against Judge Citta, but his 
action was administratively terminated on January 6, 2012 because of his failure to either 
pay the full filing fee or submit a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis.  In 
April 2012, Peeples wrote a letter requesting that the District Court reopen his case, and 
he included his complete in forma pauperis application with this letter.  On April 16, 
2012, the District Court entered an Order and accompanying Opinion granting Peeples’ 
motion to reopen the case but dismissing his complaint with prejudice.  In its Opinion, 
the District Court determined that Judge Citta was entitled to judicial immunity and that 
providing Peeples leave to amend his complaint would be futile.  Peeples then timely 
filed this appeal. 
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to 
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See id.  To survive 
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  This Court affirms 
a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim “only if, accepting all factual 
allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 
2009).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question, 
and may do so on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe
We agree with the District Court that Peeples’ claims for damages against Judge 
Citta are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.  
, 650 F.3d 246, 
247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 
(1991) (per curiam) (“[G]enerally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.”); 
Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“A judicial officer in 
the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for 
his judicial acts.”); Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth, 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 
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1998) (“It is settled that absolute judicial immunity extends only to claims for damages . . 
. .”).  While Judge Citta’s language may been viewed as disagreeable, none of his actions 
mentioned in Peeples’ complaint were taken “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction,” 
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 (citing Stump
Furthermore, Peeples’ claim that Judge Citta acted with a “malicious intention” 
cannot overcome the immunity.
, 435 U.S. at 356), and we agree that Peeples’ 
claims for damages are subject to dismissal. 
1  See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (“[J]udicial immunity is not 
overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice . . . .”); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 
227 (1988) (an act “does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice”); 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (citation omitted) (“A judge will not be 
deprived of immunity because the action he took . . . was done maliciously . . . .”).  
Although “immunity, whether qualified or absolute, is an affirmative defense which must 
be affirmatively pleaded,” Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 
1986), the District Court did not err in raising it sua sponte because the defect was clear 
from the face of Peeples’ complaint, Ray v. Kertes
                                              
1  We further agree with the District Court that Peeples’ “retaliation” claim also lacks 
merit.  To establish a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must meet a three-part test.  First, the 
plaintiff must prove that he engaged in a constitutionally-protected activity; second, he 
must demonstrate that the government responded in a retaliatory manner; and third, he 
must show that the particular protected activity caused the particular retaliation.  
Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).  Here, Peeples merely 
mentions that his First Amendment right to free speech was violated at his sentencing; 
however, his complaint instead complains of Judge Citta’s speech.  Therefore, we agree 
with the District Court that Peeples cannot meet the three-part test because he has not 
asserted a protected activity and has not demonstrated a causal connection. 
, 285 F.3d 287, 296 (3d Cir. 2002).   
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In his argument supporting his appeal, Peeples asserts that he should have been 
provided leave to amend his complaint.  Generally, a District Court should not sua sponte 
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
without providing an opportunity for the plaintiff to amend the complaint.  However, 
because we do not see how Peeples could have amended his complaint to overcome 
judicial immunity, amendment would be futile and we conclude that the District Court 
did not err in declining to allow Peeples leave to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp.
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  
, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
See
       
 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
